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Executive summary
This special report examines a recent proposal to merge the 
Australian Crime Commission (ACC) and the CrimTrac Agency. 
There are two distinct—but not irreconcilable—views 
about this proposal. For one, there’s a desire to better use 
criminal information across all jurisdictions. This view sees 
an opportunity to use CrimTrac’s data more effectively and 
for more purposes by linking it with the national criminal 
intelligence agency. On the other hand, there’s an equally 
strong desire to maintain CrimTrac’s functionality and 
to focus its investment fund on the needs of all police 
stakeholders, and not just those engaged in countering 
serious and organised crime. Reconciling these views will 
require detailed research about how a merged organisation 
would benefit all stakeholders—especially the frontline police 
and criminal intelligence operators in all the jurisdictions.
But does the merger proposal actually address the 
right question?
This special report will argue that a better way to view this 
problem is to ask how the Commonwealth can play a role as 
a steward for national criminal intelligence. This perspective 
will show that the Australian Government has two options, 
other than to do nothing: to merge the two agencies as 
proposed, or to take a staged approach that focuses on 
fixing the information-sharing and investment impediments 
first—and then consider a merger if the desired results are 
not achieved. 
How this matter is progressed depends largely on the 
attitude of the state and territory law enforcement ministers 
and police commissioners. If they support the principle, 
a merger of the ACC and CrimTrac might proceed quickly if the 
new arrangements fix the information-sharing inconsistences 
and provide some start-up investment. The Commonwealth 
should also offer some guarantees about the future of the 
national criminal information sharing enterprise to allay 
any concerns. 
But if there’s a hint that the merger proposal would create 
unnecessary friction, the Commonwealth’s ministers 
and officials should spend their political capital on 
fixing impediments that make the current arrangements 
suboptimal. Putting CrimTrac on a legislative basis would be a 
good start if this course is chosen.
Importantly, this question presents an opportunity for 
the Australian Justice Minister to give the federal Cabinet 
a chance to consider the Commonwealth’s role in law 
enforcement more holistically. This would be especially 
timely because the law enforcement sector is undergoing 
significant change and is facing real resource pressures. 
The need for better intelligence 
capabilities
This special report examines the key needs of Australia’s 
criminal intelligence system, before examining options to 
enhance the way essential data is provided for the system. 
The Australian Government has a growing need—and real 
opportunities—to enhance criminal intelligence capabilities 
against serious and organised crime. This need was 
recognised by the National Commission of Audit, which 
recommended in its March 2014 report:
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Criminal law enforcement is increasingly dependent 
on strong intelligence collection and analysis. The 
Commission recommends that CrimTrac be merged with 
the Australian Crime Commission to better harness their 
collective resources.
This is an important recommendation, but most of the 
focus so far has been on the action and not the reason for 
it. While merging the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) 
and the CrimTrac Agency would produce a good result 
over time if some key challenges are addressed, a merger 
alone isn’t enough to ensure that Australia’s future criminal 
intelligence system will be sufficiently robust to deal with 
increasing demands.
While a merger of the ACC and CrimTrac is the main matter 
being discussed right now, there’s no escaping the fact that 
more resources and greater coordination will be needed to 
enhance Australia’s criminal information system. More skilled 
analysts are needed to convert information into criminal 
intelligence. There’s a need to change the way information’s 
used and provided to others, and to ensure that the two main 
user groups—frontline police and intelligence analysts from 
all jurisdictions—are served with first-rate data. 
There is a case for a cabinet-level consideration of the 
Commonwealth’s future law enforcement role, because this 
is critical to understanding what’s expected of the national 
criminal intelligence system. 
Regardless of the path chosen from here, federal ministers 
will need to spend political capital to optimise the system. 
Acting as stewards of the system, the Attorney-General 
and the Justice Minister will need to decide on one of two 
broad options to ensure that the system is provided with 
the best possible information and meet the needs of 21st 
century users.
The first option is to push straight to a merger of the ACC and 
CrimTrac. This is a viable course, although it will need to be 
handled carefully to ensure that all stakeholders support it. It 
will also require new investment and legislative changes. 
The second is to approach the goal in a more indirect way. 
This would include a number of steps: consensus building 
to fully implement the recently agreed Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model; agreement on ways to optimise existing 
information holdings; investment to allow better use of 
criminal information for frontline police and intelligence users 
in all jurisdictions; and agreement to make the most of the 
revenue-earning potential of information in an economy that 
is increasingly connected and looking for points of truth in 
online dealings. If this incremental approach is unsuccessful, 
the Commonwealth will have built an incontrovertible 
case for major structural changes in the national criminal 
intelligence system. 
This report has been developed from interviews with 
participants involved in law enforcement at the federal and 
state levels and with experts outside government. It also 
draws upon recent government and parliamentary inquiries 
and reviews into criminal intelligence and organisational 
arrangements for law enforcement.
Four key challenges for national criminal 
information and intelligence capability
Australia’s criminal intelligence system is the product of 
the legislation, needs, processes and preferences of eight 
sovereign jurisdictions. There’s no clear and persistent 
authority. This means that changing it’s a slow process 
involving negotiation and usually incremental change. It’s 
also hampered by cultural factors based on the supply of 
and demand for information and by resourcing shortfalls 
(compared to the potential of the system and expectations 
of it).
In interviews conducted for this project, and in the 
more extensive inquiry into criminal intelligence by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Law Enforcement in 2013, 
government, police and external experts and stakeholders 
identified four main challenges.
The first challenge is to identify what’s expected of a 
‘national’ criminal intelligence system. This includes not only 
establishing an agreed definition of ‘criminal intelligence’, but 
also the principles and processes that describe the system. 
The Australian Criminal Intelligence Model has made great 
strides towards defining the system (see figure 1). The model, 
which has been agreed by 16 national agencies and the police 
ministers of each jurisdiction, aims to enable the free flow of 
criminal intelligence across the policing, law enforcement, 
law compliance and national security domains.1 The next task 
is to implement it.
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Figure 1: Australian Criminal Intelligence Model
4 Special Report
The second challenge concerns information sharing and, 
more specifically, inconsistencies in laws covering this 
activity across Australia. Different rules and expectations 
can apply to similar data held in information and intelligence 
systems2, including those belonging to a national enterprise 
such as CrimTrac. These differences are accentuated by 
different rules for handling data from different departments. 
This creates a three-dimensional matrix of difference, 
including different types of laws (for example, involving 
financial data, personal information, DNA use and oversight), 
eight different jurisdictions, and many different departments 
within each jurisdiction.
The overarching information-sharing challenge appears 
to relate to data sovereignty. In general, the states 
and territories assert ownership of the data, but this 
is generally not reflected in their laws once the data 
passes to CrimTrac—a Commonwealth entity subject to 
Commonwealth laws on information, including privacy and 
freedom of information. In addition, some jurisdictions have 
very strict end-user identification requirements for data use 
and a requirement to audit that use—which can become 
a problem once information passes into the intelligence 
domain. So, while there’s a high level of willingness to share 
data, differing legal requirements create some impediments 
for sharing in practice.
The third challenge is data interoperability, security and 
connectivity between agencies. The 2013 parliamentary 
inquiry into criminal intelligence identified a range of 
technological, legal, resource and cultural factors that 
inhibited sharing and reduced stakeholders’ confidence.3 
These factors mean that there’s no way to search all the 
data holdings simultaneously, that legislation can be an 
impediment to using the product of such searches, and 
that there’s still a mix of automated and manual searching. 
Differing levels of security classifications for information 
holdings (intelligence tends to have higher classifications 
than police data and be held on more secure systems) also 
make it harder to share intelligence based on data provided 
by the police users. These factors create impediments 
to real-time and research-style searches across the 
jurisdictions’ criminal data holdings.
The fourth challenge is the increasing complexity of policy 
responses in this area. In particular, setting policies for 
data retention and standards for new sources of data 
(including biometrics such as facial recognition and even 
naming conventions for individuals) will require the close 
involvement of many agencies—and political leadership. 
Policy questions about the potential duty of all jurisdictions 
to contribute information are also complex and go to the 
heart of the sovereignty of each. Opportunities to involve 
other policy areas in the intelligence system and responses to 
criminality are also becoming apparent, including the use of 
tools traditionally involved in education and social services. 
Making the best use of all of these policy instruments and 
technologies will require a minor reconceptualisation of 
Australia’s law enforcement systems over the next decade 
or so.
The importance of overcoming these challenges has not been 
lost on stakeholders, including the Australian Parliament.
The proposal to merge CrimTrac and the 
Australian Crime Commission 
The 52nd recommendation in the report of the National 
Commission of Audit (NCOA) identified a need to improve 
criminal intelligence capability in Australia, but the line that 
got the most attention was the advice to merge CrimTrac and 
the ACC. In the NCOA’s view, the separation of these agencies 
creates inefficiencies that only a merger can solve.
This isn’t the first time that a merger of the two agencies has 
been considered: Roger Beale’s 2009 federal audit of police 
capabilities and Stephen Skehill’s 2012 review of small and 
medium agencies within the Attorney-General’s portfolio 
both considered the same question. Unlike the NCOA, neither 
recommended a merger.
Beale and Skehill had different reasons and approaches. 
Beale saw CrimTrac’s ability to manage databases in real 
time as something the ACC and others could leverage, but a 
merger to achieve that wasn’t considered. He also suggested 
removing some of the burden for non-serious crime work 
from the ACC. 
In his review, Skehill explicitly rejected the idea of merging 
CrimTrac into another agency because its existence as 
an agency independent of both the Attorney-General’s 
Department and other portfolio agencies was essential to 
ensuring stakeholder participation. He felt that there was 
a very real chance that the states and territories would 
withdraw their support from CrimTrac if the governing 
arrangements were changed. 
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While both Beale and Skehill—and the broader law 
enforcement community—rate CrimTrac highly, it’s fair to 
assume that many others don’t know much about this niche 
organisation or its role. Understanding its role and business 
model is essential to considering whether a merger would 
deliver the results envisaged by the NCOA. 
What’s CrimTrac?
CrimTrac can trace its genesis to information-sharing 
agreements between the states dating from the 1940s. By 
the 1990s, computerised information systems were used 
under the leadership and management of the New South 
Wales Police. Pressures on this system in the lead-up to 
the 2000 Olympic Games convinced ministers and police 
commissioners from all Australian jurisdictions that a new 
system was necessary. This led to an intergovernmental 
agreement in July 2000 that created CrimTrac as a 
national partnership between all jurisdictions under 
Commonwealth leadership.
The 2000 agreement established a mixed governing 
arrangement: the new agency head reported to a 
board of management consisting of state, territory and 
Commonwealth representatives and two non-voting expert 
members. The board reported to the national-level police 
senior officers group and, ultimately, the interjurisdictional 
ministerial police council. At the same time, CrimTrac was 
established as one of only six executive agencies under 
the Commonwealth Public Service Act 1999 and Financial 
Management and Accountability Act 1997, which meant that it 
also reported directly to the Commonwealth’s Home Affairs 
(now Justice) Minister. 
CrimTrac provides a number of national information services 
to police and other authorised organisations, ranging from 
police history checks to biometric and ballistic data. This 
allows the agency to provide the National Police Reference 
Service back to the police forces, and to make money 
through the pre-employment reference checks that it sells to 
authorised organisations. This model has allowed CrimTrac to 
fund its operations and build a sizeable reserve—now around 
$112 million held in a special account—for future technology 
upgrades. State and territory police provide the vast bulk of 
the data that CrimTrac uses to generate revenue, and they 
consume a very high proportion of its services. These factors, 
together with the partnership agreement, give the states and 
territory police forces a very sizeable interest in CrimTrac’s 
operations and future. 
The implications of the NCOA’s recommendation for the 
existing CrimTrac governance arrangements are clear. 
While the Commonwealth could merge CrimTrac with 
the ACC, it would need to substantially revise the 2000 
intergovernmental agreement to do so. This would raise 
concerns about CrimTrac’s investment account and the 
use of its future revenue stream. It might also generate 
concerns about maintaining CrimTrac’s broadly focused law 
enforcement information activities.
Let’s follow the money. Because CrimTrac was established 
as a partnership, the money earned from pre-employment 
checks conducted through the agency has always been 
used to enhance the agency’s work. As one officer from a 
state police force said plainly, ‘That money belongs to all the 
commissioners, not just Canberra.’ This view was strongly 
held by a number of interviewees from state police forces and 
was understood by many in the Commonwealth. The amount 
of money raised also allowed the Australian Government, 
back in 2012–13, to remove the ‘interest equivalency 
payment’ and present a net saving for the federal budget.
Another important consideration is CrimTrac’s purpose: 
sharing police information across state and territory borders. 
This information is provided by the jurisdictions (including 
the Australian Federal Police) and it has broad utility. While 
the original purpose of holding information about peoples’ 
identities remains, that information can be used to address 
serious and organised crime and ‘volume crime’, such as 
theft. Indeed, the distinction between those types of crime 
is often moot when it comes to data holdings, as organised 
crime figures sit beside petty criminals in the data—and some 
petty crims go on to bigger things. 
In addition, CrimTrac hosts a number of national registration 
databases. Its utility in car registrations and ballistics is 
already recognised, and it’s going to be used to report 
online crime soon. This last area is being developed in 
close cooperation with the ACC and all the police forces. 
Potentially, more revenue-raising activities could also be 
undertaken using CrimTrac’s capabilities, including document 
certification and identity security. These changes show how 
the basic system and, importantly, the trust generated by 
success can be adapted to meet emerging needs.
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This means that any merger proposal should be framed with 
these key factors in mind—the existing CrimTrac partnership, 
contributions to data on volume crime and real-time identity 
checking, and the agency’s current investment fund and 
future earnings. A failure to address these matters could 
affect the relationship between CrimTrac’s state, territory 
and national stakeholders as the new arrangements 
are considered.
That would be a bad outcome, because CrimTrac administers 
a number of real-time information databases relevant to a 
wide range of crimes. Still, the NCOA appears to think that 
the nation’s criminal intelligence system could get more from 
CrimTrac if the agency were merged with the ACC. 
What does the Australian Crime 
Commission need?
The ACC was formed in 2003 as the nation’s leading agency 
in the fight against organised crime. It was the product of a 
merger of three Commonwealth law enforcement agencies, 
and it was given extraordinary powers to conduct special 
investigations and operations using coercive powers to 
gather information. Those powers allow the ACC to compel 
witnesses to attend hearings and give testimony, and to 
require agencies and individuals to provide documents 
to it. The ACC also has covert capabilities and access to 
telecommunications interception, human sources and 
physical and technical surveillance. That means that the 
ACC has special investigatory powers and capabilities in 
addition to powers like those of a standing royal commission. 
Importantly, the ACC was designed as a ‘national’ agency, 
with a board including Commonwealth, state and territory 
police commissioners and senior officials.
Some have long been concerned about the inability to 
use advanced analytical systems across CrimTrac’s data 
for intelligence gathering. This kind of activity—which 
is distinct from the well-used referencing-checking 
function—uses informed profiling to look for patterns of 
behaviour and criminal activity. This is seen as critical to 
understanding organised crime in the 21st century. But 
the speculative nature of this work makes it more difficult 
to use point-in-time downloads of material, which the ACC 
currently uses to obtain data from CrimTrac. Put simply, the 
ACC doesn’t necessarily have the background information 
it needs to make requests using the current system. It also 
needs to keep going back to CrimTrac regularly because the 
data holdings keep changing and need updating.
Others stress the opportunity involved in the NCOA 
recommendation. A merger of the ACC, CrimTrac and perhaps 
the Australian Government’s financial intelligence unit, 
the Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis Centre 
(AUSTRAC), would create a truly federated law enforcement 
body that would specialise in gathering criminal data to 
produce intelligence for all the nation’s law enforcement 
agencies. This merger would promote national responses 
to organised crime, which is an attractive way to address 
the need identified by the NCOA. A merger would create an 
agency with the size to drive a coordinated national criminal 
intelligence effort, the benefits of which are hard to estimate 
fully right now. And the canny decision last April to appoint 
a very senior state police officer to head the ACC could allay 
some fears associated with this change. That would be good, 
because a Commonwealth–state partnership arrangement in 
an agency with resources, remit and direction could produce 
more than just the sum of its parts. Such an agency could 
produce a very good outcome.
However, the key immediate issue—based on responses 
from interviewees for this report and the testimony given 
to the 2013 parliamentary inquiry—is law enforcement 
information-sharing and the current view that these 
arrangements are not as effective as they could be. At 
present, all Australian law enforcement agencies (not just 
the ACC) can’t make the most of the nation’s criminal data 
holdings. The opportunity to change this has been recognised 
for some time and improvements have been made, according 
to officials interviewed for this report. But they’ve not been 
totally successful, and some technical and legal impediments 
to the desired ‘unfettered access’ to CrimTrac’s data remain. 
It’s clear that the NCOA was inspired, at least in part, by 
this problem. Fortunately, the Australian Government has 
some options.
Options to enhance the use of criminal 
data in the fight against crime
Perhaps the best way to come to a recommendation about 
the NCOA’s proposal is to ask how the data held by CrimTrac 
can be optimised in the fight against all crime (that is, 
volume crime and serious and organised crime). This focus 
on the desired outcome allows us to consider three broad 
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options for CrimTrac’s future governance arrangements, 
and the broader need to enhance the nation’s criminal 
intelligence system.
Option 1: Do nothing
The first option is to reject the NCOA recommendation and 
do nothing. Given other priorities in the law enforcement 
space, and the number of current issues involving state and 
federal government relationships, this may be attractive 
to some. However, it would mean that the opportunity 
to optimise information sharing isn’t taken, so it’s not a 
good option. 
Option 2: A straight merger
A straight merger of CrimTrac with the ACC, as proposed 
by the NCOA, would transfer all CrimTrac functions to the 
ACC, including responsibility for its current operations, 
future investment strategy and new products. Changes to 
accommodate former CrimTrac functions could be made to 
the ACC’s legislation. 
To achieve the merger, the Australian Government would 
need to offer some guarantees to the states and territories, 
because the attitudes of their ministers and police 
commissioners are critical to this option. 
The first guarantee would ensure that the state 
commissioners’ voices are not diluted in this change. 
Currently, the ACC board includes all state and territory 
police commissioners as well as a similar number of 
Commonwealth representatives. In contrast, there’s only two 
voting members representing the Commonwealth on the 
CrimTrac board—the Australian Federal Police Commissioner 
and a senior official from the Attorney-General’s Department. 
While the current system provides a high level of certainty 
that the voices of all jurisdictions are heard, a ‘non-dilution’ 
guarantee would help smooth the way for further discussions 
about the merger.
The second guarantee would ensure that other priority 
needs, such as work on volume crime without strong links 
to organised crime, is incorporated in planning. It would 
also be important to pitch the change as a benefit to all 
jurisdictions—it’s not an attempt to give the ACC exclusive 
use of the data, but to make the data more available to all 
agencies for more purposes.
Third, it might be necessary to maintain the separate fund 
to promote the former CrimTrac objectives within the ACC 
budget, and to have a new hook in the ACC’s legislation that 
clearly sets out the agreed guarantees. 
In turn, the Australian Government would probably ask 
that the future earnings from pre-employment identity 
checks and other possible future opportunities (such as a 
document verification service) be used to improve national 
criminal intelligence and information capability. Ensuring 
that frontline police, intelligence specialists and other law 
enforcement officers have access to the best information 
through the optimal use of data and checks will be critical to 
all police commissioners and so must be part of any merger. 
So, while there’s a need to retain these basic checks, there’s 
also an opportunity to add greater value to them through the 
fusion of intelligence and data. 
The advantages of this option include adding to the ACC’s 
ability to strongly influence national criminal information 
gathering priorities. It would also promote and perhaps 
facilitate a faster implementation of the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Model because it could allow mutually beneficial 
investments in information connectivity and tools to be used 
for this purpose. 
The change would also provide the ACC—and other 
interested agencies—with more opportunities to create new 
intelligence. This will extend intelligence far beyond the use 
of reporting to create analyses, because it will allow bulk data 
to be analysed to obtain new insights into criminal activity.
Given the desire to use more intelligence in some background 
checks—such as those in the maritime and aviation security 
sectors—adding intelligence to CrimTrac’s fact-based data 
to create threat warnings to frontline police seems logical 
if problems such as those involving data and personnel 
security classifications can be overcome. This may require 
new databases and new search technologies that would 
help link any that are not already linked, which has the clear 
potential to provide real, new benefits.
Organisationally, some efficiencies could accrue to the 
merged organisation, perhaps most directly in information 
systems and facilities. It’s clear that some strategic 
investments in IT systems would benefit both agencies 
and ensure connectivity and data compatibility. There 
are some potential opportunities to further leverage their 
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already close cooperation for mutual benefit. Already, the 
servers supporting CrimTrac and the ACC are co-located, 
and CrimTrac uses the ACC’s email system for some 
activities. There could be opportunities to conduct joint IT 
research and procurement, and perhaps to manage some 
of the ACC’s databases beside those created by CrimTrac, 
which has the potential to add to the efficiencies. CrimTrac 
also has significant expertise in IT project management 
and data administration that would be very useful to the 
merged organisation. At a minimum, it would make the 
task of harmonising information and intelligence needs 
simpler because they would be driven by a single board and 
implemented by a single chief executive.
There are some disadvantages with the straight merger 
option. At the management level, the CEO of the ACC would 
be looking after data and serving needs that relate to volume 
crime within jurisdictions. This seems to complicate the 
Australian Government’s desire to make the ACC ‘Australia’s 
premier criminal intelligence body’ because it would 
involve the organisation in areas that aren’t really central to 
combating serious and organised crime. There’s also a risk 
that new initiatives or new markets for criminal data might 
not be explored if they are a low priority in the fight against 
organised crime. 
Also, it’s not clear that a straight merger would deliver 
the desired benefits without other changes that promote 
information sharing and new investment. In particular, it’s 
not certain that the merged body would be able to pay for 
the necessary technical overlays that could aggregate the 
existing databases so they could be searched, unless funds 
are found from CrimTrac or new investments, perhaps funded 
by unexplained-wealth seizures. And the data sovereignty 
challenges remain, too. It’s too early to tell whether some 
of the challenges created by information sovereignty and 
inconsistent legislation would be overcome immediately 
by a merger. This is not to say that such investment and 
information sharing changes couldn’t be arranged, but only 
that they should be examined as the proposal is developed. 
Still, this option won’t get off the ground unless the state 
and territory governments are willing to cooperate. Indeed, 
it would be harmful to progress this proposal at a time when 
there’s so much controversy about Commonwealth–state 
finances and a ‘federation’ white paper is underway unless 
there’s a very high level of confidence that a merger would 
be accepted.
So after testing the water, it may be necessary for the 
Australian Government’s ministers to spend some political 
capital or dangle sufficiently juicy carrots in front of the 
states (such as new funding for their priorities) to make a 
straight merger happen.
Option 3: A staged approach 
The third option is to adopt a staged approach to changes 
that enhance national criminal intelligence capability. This 
would focus on negotiating improvements in information 
sharing and connectivity within current organisational 
boundaries, and then assessing whether a merger of 
CrimTrac and the ACC is needed to realise both the aspiration 
for enhanced intelligence and efficiencies in data collection 
and management. 
This option would require the Commonwealth’s 
Attorney-General, Justice Minister and senior officials to 
put all of their effort into convincing their state and territory 
counterparts (and perhaps also the Australian Parliament) 
to make changes that will promote the ability of all agencies 
to exploit CrimTrac’s data. This may require legislative 
change—or just clarification—in some jurisdictions. This 
course leaves the merger option open, but places it ‘on ice’ 
until all jurisdictions agree that the change, akin to Option 2, 
is needed. 
As part of this option, it would be worth establishing a 
legislative basis for CrimTrac. This view has already been 
expressed a number of times, including by Skehill, the 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, academic Saskia 
Hufnagel4 and some interviewed for this report. Legislation 
could formalise important matters such as CrimTrac’s role, 
governance and oversight. Importantly, the legislation could 
also identify who CrimTrac is authorised to share information 
with, and the conditions under which that information 
could be shared. If this legislation could be harmonised 
with relevant laws in all jurisdictions, there would be a 
real opportunity to address and resolve the matter of how 
CrimTrac shares its information with all Australian law 
enforcement, regulatory and intelligence agencies. The 
ACC’s chief executive officer could also be brought onto the 
CrimTrac board as part of this change.
This course has some advantages. First, it’s likely to involve 
less political friction, especially because it wouldn’t involve 
an up-front move by the Commonwealth to ‘centralise’ a 
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function under its control. It would instead shift the onus 
onto all jurisdictions to make changes that enhance the 
current system before further steps are contemplated. It also 
puts the focus squarely upon promoting opportunities for 
all jurisdictions to mine CrimTrac’s data, while retaining the 
integrity of the existing business model. This would maintain 
CrimTrac’s broad focus on volume and organised crime, allow 
it to explore all new markets and opportunities, and not cost 
the Commonwealth a cent. 
Some of this option’s other advantages reflect the 
disadvantages of Option 2, especially in the way it 
would retain an independent CrimTrac that could 
focus on information sharing, albeit in a manner more 
closely integrated with the intelligence-sharing needs 
described above.
The disadvantages of the staged option include the lack of 
focus in the proposal: a detailed action plan, which identifies 
the key steps needed to promote the desired increased 
level of utility for CrimTrac’s information, would be needed. 
Also, this option mightn’t go anywhere if some participants 
express satisfaction with the current situation. It relies on 
a willingness on the part of all jurisdictions to undertake 
legislative change that will, importantly, impose further 
delay. Also forgone, at least for a time, is the opportunity to 
increase the resources available to the ACC.
It’s also tempting to argue that if this option would work, 
Option 2 wouldn’t have been recommended. That might be 
true. But, human nature being what it is, perhaps a staged 
approach is needed to encourage action by all jurisdictions to 
solve existing information-sharing limitations and to promote 
future investment in a national approach that will make 
the most of CrimTrac’s data holdings. A joint meeting of the 
ACC and CrimTrac boards might be a useful way to start this 
discussion, at least so that senior officers can consider the 
needs of both organisations at the same time.
There are other opportunities to make the ACC even 
more capable. One would be to incorporate the financial 
intelligence functions of AUSTRAC into the ACC. The NCOA 
listed this opportunity as only a ‘maybe’, but on face value it 
has real potential to boost criminal intelligence capability. It’s 
worthy of close study in the context of some other needs that 
have been raised by the NCOA’s recommendation and the 
merger proposal. 
The merger proposal highlights deeper 
needs 
Deeper needs highlighted by the merger proposal include not 
only the need for better information and technology but also 
increasing operational imperatives for enhanced criminal 
intelligence capacity. The growing influence of international 
actors in Australia’s organised crime scene is one driver of 
the need for better and deeper capability. According to the 
ACC’s former CEO, John Lawler, about 70% of organised crime 
in Australia is directed from overseas—especially Southeast 
Asia. As the internet becomes a greater vector for crime, we 
should expect crime to become an even greater concern for 
the Commonwealth. 
Cyber developments are also allowing some ‘traditional’ 
crimes to mutate into online forms, so now you don’t need to 
meet a criminal to be affected by their activities. ‘Darknets’ 
and ‘cryptocurrencies’ are also being used to circumvent 
traditional law enforcement controls, which dramatically 
increases the complexity and costs of investigations and 
intelligence gathering.
These trends make falling resources for Australia’s criminal 
intelligence agency particularly concerning. This year, 
the ACC will receive about $87 million from the Australian 
Government. This is due to fall to $72 million in 2017–18 (and 
the impact of inflation will probably reduce the figure by 7.5% 
in real terms). Incoming ACC Chief Executive Chris Dawson 
has explained that the agency’s staff numbers are set to fall 
to around 450 by 2017–18. This leaves the agency about 150 
staff members short, by Dawson’s estimation. At the same 
time, expectations of the ACC are increasing, the agency’s 
technology is overdue for replacement, and the challenge 
of organised crime grows, particularly as it becomes more 
transnational and exploits the cyberdomain. Put simply, 
the Australian Government is unlikely to get the criminal 
intelligence system it wants with the money it’s planning to 
pay for it. There’s a pressing need to revise the ACC’s funding 
base, unless reducing the number of intelligence probes into 
serious and organised crime, special investigations and areas 
of expertise is a palatable outcome for the government and 
the national interest.
These aren’t the only choices about law enforcement that 
the Australian Government will need to make. A number of 
other law enforcement areas involving more agencies than 
just the ACC and CrimTrac will require attention in the very 
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near future. First among them is managing, and perhaps 
rationalising, a large committee superstructure that governs 
the national response to crime. There’s also a new minister 
and agency with law enforcement responsibilities on the way 
(the Australian Border Force). And there’s an inconsistent 
legislative regime across Australia, some outdated policy 
frameworks, and an underutilised resource in business and 
the community. 
There’s also an increasing need to consider 
non-law-enforcement tools in the fight against organised 
crime. Following the example of countries such as the United 
Kingdom, it’s worth considering how Australia’s social and 
educational policy tools can be marshalled to bolster law 
enforcement efforts to stop important incubators of crime 
and gang recruitment. These efforts might also involve 
different ways to engage the business and community in 
this effort.
Organisationally, there are important emerging concerns 
about human capital for law enforcement, a diminishing 
resource base in the forward estimates, and a disaggregated 
approach to research and development.
It’s time for the Abbott Cabinet to have a chance to 
consider its preferred ways to conduct law enforcement 
at the Commonwealth level in a holistic way, perhaps by 
commissioning a law enforcement white paper. 
A white paper would be a big task, and perhaps more 
complicated than even the Defence white paper process, 
as the state and territory governments would need to 
be involved. But it would complement the Australian 
Government’s federation white paper and create an 
opportunity for the Cabinet to think carefully about how 
law-enforcement relationships will work in Australia’s future.
Importantly, such a paper would also give the Cabinet a 
chance to explore enhancements to Australia’s criminal 
intelligence system beyond those envisaged by the NCOA.
The Commonwealth as steward of 
national criminal intelligence
CrimTrac’s federated governance arrangements mean that 
the Commonwealth cannot claim to ‘own’ it in anything but 
a strictly legal sense. Indeed, the Commonwealth would do 
better to view itself more as a ‘steward’ of CrimTrac, and 
criminal intelligence more broadly, that works to further 
the organisation for a common national purpose. Providing 
public goods at the national level is, after all, a proper role for 
the Commonwealth.
Providing those goods will require resources, and a 
‘merger and acquisition’ approach has some appeal. 
It should certainly be considered and discussed by the 
Commonwealth’s Justice Minister and his state counterparts, 
and by the ACC and CrimTrac boards. If there’s a clear 
willingness on the part of all involved to genuinely explore 
the proposal, then a merger of the ACC and CrimTrac should 
be scoped further. Some guarantees by the Commonwealth 
could be offered—including preserving the broad focus of 
data collection, the use of the investment fund and future 
earnings for mutual benefit, and an agreed way to make sure 
that state police commissioners’ needs will continue to be 
heard and met. The guarantees would put the negotiations 
on a strong footing.
But if there’s opposition or doubt that the merger will 
be acceptable to the states and territories, despite all 
guarantees, then the staged approach outlined above should 
be adopted. This approach would make sure that the federal 
ministers don’t burn their political capital unnecessarily 
and risk what’s an excellent interjurisdictional venture. It 
would also make sure that there’s some movement towards 
enhancing the nation’s criminal intelligence system. Placing 
CrimTrac on a legislative basis might aid that process and 
kick-start the negotiations.
Regardless of the course taken, there’s no avoiding the fact 
that the ACC will lose some intelligence analysis capability 
over the next few years if the budget forward estimates 
remain as they are. The commission also needs some 
investment to replace outdated information and intelligence 
platforms. These problems are likely to make the commission 
focus more narrowly, and to make do with outdated 
IT systems at a time when opportunities to exploit the 
cyberdomain for intelligence purposes are growing.
At the same time, law enforcement at the Commonwealth 
level is becoming more complex with the increasing threat 
from overseas criminals, the introduction of a third minister 
and agency with law enforcement responsibilities through 
the Australian Border Force, and a range of legislative, policy, 
resource and human capital needs. A white paper, perhaps 
developed in-house or by a small panel of eminent experts, 
would be a good way for the federal Cabinet to take a holistic 
view of its role in fighting crime.
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